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Cyber deception tools are increasingly sophisticated 
but rely on a limited set of deception techniques. In 
current deployments of cyber deception, the network 
infrastructure between the defender and attacker 
comprises the defence/attack surface. For cyber 
deception tools and techniques to evolve further they 
must address the wider attack surface; from the network 
through to the physical and cognitive space. One way of 
achieving this is by fusing deception techniques from the 
physical and cognitive space with the technology 
development process. In this paper we trial design 
thinking as a way of delivering this fused approach. We 
detail the results from a design thinking workshop 
conducted using deception experts from different fields. 
The workshop outputs include a critical analysis of 
design provocations for cyber deception and a journey 
map detailing considerations for operationalising cyber 
deception scenarios that fuse deception techniques from 





Current best practice for discovery of a network 
intrusion is 100 days, yet organisations that deploy cyber 
deception can experience a 91% reduction in dwell time 
in the network [1] by alerting system administrators to 
unauthorised access. For any military organisation not 
deploying cyber deception technology means an 
adversary potentially has a foothold on Defence 
networks and is able to extract information about 
military tactics, techniques and procedures for 100 days. 
This perimeter defence approach to cyber security is not 
enough. Nowhere else in the warfighting environment 
would it be acceptable for the enemy to operate inside 
our boundary without active measures being deployed 
once inside the perimeter. If we continue this 
comparison with the physical environment we can see 
that as the military move to a manoeuvrist approach 
[2], away from relying on a defeat level of force, success 
depends less on preparing solely for a zero- sum game 
through more efficient kinetic warfare and more towards 
understanding how to achieve a desired effect on the 
behaviour of the adversary. The same is true with cyber 
security measures and the use of cyber deception 
technology. While the current technology is increasingly 
sophisticated and is advancing as a technological 
capability, it is currently constrained primarily to issuing 
alerts and logging. It has so far failed to encompass the 
full range of deception tools and techniques that are used 
in other contexts. In this paper we use design thinking to 
explore ways to place cyber deception in the manoeuvre 
toolkit of network defenders and to offer solutions that 
have the potential to shape the will and behaviour of 
adversaries in our networks. Deception activities that 
aim to influence adversary behaviour have long been 
part of military planning and are critical to the success of 
physical military operations. With the network being 
seen as a domain of warfare we need to find ways to give 
cyber defenders the psychological tools to deny attackers 
the freedom to operate in cyberspace. 
Deception has been defined as, ‘deliberate measures 
to induce erroneous sensemaking and subsequent 
behaviour within a target audience, to achieve and 
exploit an advantage’ [3]. The key elements here are 
erroneous sensemaking, an intentional act to bring the 
deceiver an advantage, a focus on the process of 
induction used by the victim, causing a change in 
behaviour, and targeting a specific audience. While 
some cyber deception technology arguably meets this 
definition, to a large extent the reach of such technology 
is contained within the network and does not consider 
the full scope of the attack/defence surface from the 
defender’s cognitive processes to the attacker’s cognitive 
processes. 
Cyber deception has the potential, however, to 
restore the balance of power from the attacker to the 
defender, overcoming the asymmetric advantage that 
attackers currently have [4], [5]. Traditionally, outside of 
the network domain, deception is utilised to achieve a 
range of different effects beyond offering a physical 
honeypot to detect / distract an attacker. Such effects 
incorporate simulation such as mimicking, inventing and 
decoying, and dissimulation such as masking, 





repackaging and dazzling [6]. If one looks beyond the 
technology-centric view and considers the experience of 
the attacker being targeted, many of the principles seen 
in other applications of deception could be used for 
cyber deception (for example, see [7]). 
Our aim in this paper is to explore how we can 
synthesise deception techniques from deceptive concepts 
employed outside of the cyber domain with cyber 
deception technology and deploy them as part of a 
network defence strategy. We highlight design thinking 
as a methodology that can contribute to developing this 
fused approach. Design thinking is a philosophy as well 
as a practical process. It has creativity and innovation at 
its heart and is about translating an idea into a reality 
that creates value. It is inherently transdisciplinary 
bringing together different academic disciplines with 
practitioner experiences. 
In this paper we detail the results from a design 
thinking workshop carried out with deception experts 
from academia, government, a cyber deception 
technology company and independent defence and 
security experts. Our participants have skillsets that 
encompass social and behavioural science expertise as 
well as computer science, software engineering and 
cryptography. The outputs from the workshop include a 
critical analysis of design provocations for cyber 
deception and a journey map of potential issues to 
consider when operationalising cyber deception 
scenarios. We conclude with our reflections on the 
workshop and recommendations for future research and 
practice. 
 
2. Background and related works 
 
Cyber defenders are required to understand usual 
network behaviour and activity, from which, deviations 
may suggest potential threats [5]. Cyber defenders 
operate in complex socio-technical systems and their 
responses are influenced by their shared awareness, 
organisational influences and level of expertise [8]. 
Nyre-Yu et al. [8] argue that too much emphasis has 
been placed on improving algorithms and cyber security 
analyst education while ignoring the integration and 
interaction between the human and technology. 
Cyber deception, however, has been an active topic 
of consideration for some years. Cohen’s Deception 
Toolkit (DTK) [9] dates back to 1998 and Spitzner’s 
Honeynet Project has been in existence since 1999 [10]. 
In recent years there has been research on cyber 
deception to protect cyber-physical systems [11], cyber 
deception has been used in wargaming [12], and there 
has been research on active deception for cloud 
infrastructures [13]. While social engineering arguably 
focuses on deception at the interface between behaviour 
and technology it does not focus on the activity in a 
network. Stech et al. [14] argue that cyber tactics are not 
mapped onto the classic components of denial and 
deception tactics; that there is no conventional 
terminology to describe the phenomenon of deception in 
cyberspace; that classic deception domain terminology is 
rarely used; and that classic deception domain 
researchers are rarely cited within the field. In short, 
cyber deception researchers seem rarely to study, exploit 
or build on the body of research that already exists about 
deception in other domains. 
As Shade et al. [15] have pointed out, most research 
on cyber deception tools tends to focus on honeypots 
[16], suggesting ways to improve them [17], deliver 
them as a service [18], or to recognise their deficiencies 
[18], [19]. Where cyber deception research extends 
beyond honeypots it still tends to build from a computer 
science or engineering perspective [18], [19], [20], [21] 
with a smaller number of examples of research that 
include the impact of humans on cyber deception 
through, ‘cognitive models and experimental games’ 
[22] and ‘computational models of human cognition’ 
[20]. The assumption in such research is one of rational 
decision-making with a focus on formal rules or models 
in how decisions are made [23]. As cyber deception 
research has highlighted, however, we also need to 
understand the cognitive and behavioural processes of 
both the attacker and defender to improve cyber 
deception [22], [24], [25]. 
There is a limited but growing amount of research 
that demonstrates the value of bringing behavioural 
science and cyber deception together to deliver more 
innovative cyber deception techniques. Oppositional 
human factors for example, seek to flip ideas that are 
used to improve cyber security, to instead disrupt 
attacker cognition and behaviour and increase decision-
making biases [25], [26], [27]. Attackers may not be 
familiar with a system they are penetrating and they 
should not expect a system to have good usability or 
design that would benefit them [25]. This presents 
opportunities to create deceptive systems, which disrupt 
the attackers’ decision-making processes. With a vast 
cyber-attack surface any gain from disrupting attackers’ 
decision-making is positive [25]. 
Creating decoy systems with large numbers of false 
assets as opposed to real ones can reduce the ability of 
an attacker to successfully target a real asset through 
reducing their chances, distracting them from real assets, 
and forcing them to switch attention and perform 
additional tasks which, in turn, slows them down 
[4][28]. Further benefits of decoy systems can be the 
improved detection of attackers from their engagement 
with false assets and increasing their level of confusion 
about the network’s credibility [4]. Decoy networks have 
been extensively tested through red-teaming 
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experiments, including detailed exploration of red 
teamers’ behaviour, personality and cognition, and 
physiological responses to cyber deception [28]. 
Use of host-based deception and deceptive messages 
has been shown in experiments to disrupt attacker 
decision-making, increase the time to conduct the 
deception and increase confusion within the attacker or 
attacking team [15]. Other cyber security testing 
includes Capture the Flag (CTF) exercises where 
attackers are required to exfiltrate assets from a network 
[29]. Such exercises, however, rarely measure actual 
human behaviour, performance and cognition, in 
response to active network defence using cyber 
deception [29]. 
Exploring the behavioural facets of cyber deception 
through experiment is valuable because as Shade et al. 
[15] point out, experiments have the ‘necessary rigor’ to 
deliver evidence-based results for the implementation of 
cyber deception techniques. Gutzwiller et al. [25], 
however, demonstrate the value of qualitative research in 
cyber deception by using exploratory ‘think-aloud’ 
techniques with red teamers to understand how it might 
be possible to exploit ‘traditional decision-making 
biases’ with cyber deception tools. Shade et al. [15], also 
highlight the value of collecting the qualitative 
‘emotional experiences’ of those experiencing cyber 
deception. Such methodological approaches facilitate the 
gathering of rich data that, while it may not have the 
generalisability of experimental results, arguably make 
up for this by taking a naturalistic approach to cyber 
deception and providing a range of complementary 
insights. 
The argument for a more naturalistic approach is 
heightened with the knowledge that humans perform 
poorly compared to algorithms in low validity 
environments [23]. In naturalistic settings decision- 
making is often conducted in conditions of varying 
uncertainty, time pressure, and cognitive load, which 
affects the ability to assess options [23]. The key here is 
to understand attacker and defender decision- making 
across socio-technical contexts in the field, and using 
input from cyber deception experts to inform how 
deceptive systems are designed. In taking this approach 
we build on the work of Reid and Black 
[30] and their qualitative, inductive study. This research 
includes a discussion about the connection between 
technology, and the real-world context (referencing the 
work on warrants and digital footprints by [31], [32]) 
and highlights the need for dynamic cyber deception 
systems and methods  [17], [22] and for deception tools 
that are both ‘generic and expressive’ [28]. 
 
3. Design thinking 
 
In the field of software development, design thinking 
has been used in requirements elicitation [33], to 
improve scrum and lean start up [34] and for innovation 
in agile software development [35]. The value of design 
thinking is also well recognised for designing  military  
systems  [36]  where Zweibelson [37] states that design 
thinking facilitates ‘creating what is needed but does not 
yet exist’. The aim of design thinking is to create new 
ways of seeing, thinking and acting to develop not one 
solution but ‘high-quality interventions to bring the 
whole system forward into a more desired state’ [38]. As 
Buchanan [39] suggests design thinking aims to ‘connect 
and integrate knowledge from many different 
specializations into productive’ results’. 
Design thinking is both a philosophy and a practical 
process. It has innovation at its heart and is participatory 
and transdisciplinary in practice. The basic steps to the 
design thinking process [40] are: 
 
(i) to empathise with the end user and their 
understanding from their perspective; 
(ii) to focus on exploring the problem in depth and 
detail and from multiple perspectives rather than 
rushing to fix on a solution; 
(iii) to ideate by using divergent thinking to open up 
creative possibilities; 
(iv) to prototype those creative possibilities by 
developing low fidelity models to start to refine 
ideas through convergent thinking; 
(v) to test the results. 
 
The process for design thinking encourages 
movement between divergent and convergent thinking. 
Divergent thinking is about creating choices by opening 
up possibilities and potential solutions, while convergent 
thinking is about making choices by tempering these 
ideas with real-world expertise and knowledge. It is an 
approach that encourages constructive and generative 
dialogue between inductive, deductive and abductive 
reasoning. The innovation that potentially comes from 
design thinking occurs because participants are 
encouraged to step into different worlds and experience 
different worldviews. This experience encourages 
abductive reasoning by focusing on ‘what might be’ [41] 
in the gaps between these various worlds and different 
perspectives. The act of synthesising information from 
different sources is an abductive sensemaking process 
where we make a ‘motivated, continuous effort to 
understand connections’ [42]. The resulting synthesis of 
world views encourages innovation through a ‘leap of 
inference or intuition’ [41]. 
Given that our aim is to fuse deception techniques 
from different contexts and environments so that we can 
innovate cyber deception tools, design thinking offers an 
interesting approach. In terms of our research problem 
our end user is the attacker as it is the attacker who is the 
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individual experiencing the network environment and 
the deception technology. As our interest was primarily 
to generate new ideas for cyber deception and to start to 
understand the implications of operationalising those 
ideas, we focused on those parts of the design thinking 
process that seek to understand the problem, and on 
ideation and prototyping. We developed two tasks. The 
first was to use provocations from different types of 
deception activities as a jumping off point for 
understanding the problem and ideation. The second task 
was to use journey mapping as a way of prototyping the 
ideas generated by thinking through how they would be 
realised. 
 
4. Data collection 
 
We needed to take account of a number of potentially 
destabilising aspects in our design- thinking workshop. 
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic we had to run the 
workshop online. While the facilitators have experience 
of running design thinking workshops, online delivery 
was new to them. We decided to use Zoom for video 
communication and for creating two virtual break-out 
rooms for group work. For the workshop activities we 
used an outline whiteboard application called Miro. One 
of the benefits of delivering the workshop online meant 
we could include expert participants from across both the 
UK and Australia. The drawback was that this meant we 
were working across two time zones - for UK 
participants the workshop ran from 0830 to 1100 and for 
Australian participants the workshop ran from 1730 to 
2000. We wanted diversity in our participants’ 
occupations and our aim was to synthesise knowledge 
across disciplines, or at least bring it into generative 
dialogue. This meant for this initial workshop we wanted 
to invite participants who would be more likely to be 
comfortable engaging in this type of activity. To 
maintain privacy and encourage the sharing of creative 
ideas we chose not to record the workshop but to collect 
the outputs in the form of field notes and the information 
created on the Miro whiteboard with virtual post-its 




While taking these factors into account we also 
needed to identify participants with expertise in 
deception, along with expertise in across social and 
behavioural sciences, cyber security, software 
engineering, computer sciences and cryptography, who 
would also be open to a design thinking approach. As 
design thinking is inherently transdisciplinary it is not a 
natural skill for everyone. It is often a journey of trust, 
risk and fear because as Bernstein [43] highlights there 
is ‘pain inherent in abandoning one’s intellectual 
comfort zone by working outside one’s home discipline’. 
The lack of understanding of each other’s methods leads 
to fragile trust relationships that can break down’ [44]. 
Accordingly, our pool of potential participants was small 
and we invited six participants who comprised two 
commercial technology designers, one Government 
scientist from Defence, one independent behavioural 
deception expert, one academic researching cyberspace 
operations, and one cryptography engineer. Three of our 
participants have experience of thinking from an 
adversarial perspective in a cyber security environment. 
Two academics facilitated the workshop – one in the UK 
and one in Australia. Both have expertise in cyber 
security in a national defence and security context. A 
further academic with experience in the psychology of 




The two facilitators set up the Miro board with the 
agenda, introductory remarks and the two workshop 
tasks. Given that none of the participants had experience 
using Miro we decided not to allow them user access to 
the whiteboard because it would have been a distraction, 
but to share our facilitator screens so that they could see 
the tasks as well as the facilitators adding virtual post-its 
of their contributions on the whiteboard as they worked 
their way through the design thinking tasks. 
The workshop was kept to 2.5 hours because our 
experience of participating in online workshops is that 
they are more tiring than physical workshops and also 
because of the time zone difference. We started the 
workshop with introductions, setting the teams for the 
group work, discussing the agenda and setting workshop 
rules to ensure we created a safe space where 
participants felt comfortable to contribute freely. One of 
the facilitators gave a brief overview of the design 
thinking process. 
Prior to the workshop each participant had received a 
set of six design provocations on slides. The aim of the 
provocations was to spark ideas and prompt different 
ways of thinking about cyber deception. Each slide 
comprised an image and brief explanatory text. The 
slides included the following: (i) Japanese castle 
defences; (ii) code smells in software engineering; (iii) 
sliding doors (iv) gang graffiti and tagging; (v) the plot 
of an Indiana Jones action adventure movie; and (vi) 
deception for physical safety. 
The first task in the workshop took one hour and was 
a discussion of each provocation in turn, with discussion 
points recorded as ideas on virtual post-its. For the 
second task we also allocated one hour. We put 
participants into two break-out groups to discuss what a 








5.1.1. Japanese castle defences. This provocation used 
the example of Japanese castle defences [45] where 
paths would be designed to canalise attackers. The path 
might be sloped with uneven steps so that attackers 
would be forced to slow down or consciously navigate 
the path. It might wind far longer than it needed to both 
increase the distance attackers had to travel, but also to 
make them more visible to defenders. The discussion 
that arose from this focused on whether we could guide 
an attacker through a network in a similar way, thereby 
increasing the mental load on the attacker while also 
slowing them down and making observation easier. 
Interestingly the idea of lengthening paths has been 
researched and, while still in early stages, changing 
configurations in a network can increase uncertainty and 
ambiguity [46], [47]. One participant made the point that 
if the path is too complex attackers may well simply find 
an easier way into the system and that might be via a 
different exploitation route such as exploiting someone 
with legitimate access. The other concern was that such 
a defence might impede the normal running of the 
network. The conclusion was that for cyber deception 
this was ‘interesting but complex’ and the trade-off 
between normal running and network defence needed to 
be understood. There was discussion over whether this 
was a deception technique even though it focused on, 
‘influencing and shaping behaviour’. While not using 
deception in the way we would normally expect, one 
participant pointed out that it does work deceptively in 
the form of a lure. 
 
5.1.2. Code smells. This provocation was based on 
‘code smells’ [48] and the idea that software code may 
have a surface indication that ‘corresponds to a deeper 
problem in the system’.  For example, Martin Fowler 
[49] suggests that ‘A long method is a good example of 
this - just looking at the code and my nose twitches if I 
see more than a dozen lines of java’. This provocation 
raised the question of whether you could introduce a 
code smell so that an attacker would conclude that, ‘This 
doesn’t feel right for what I understand about the 
machine’. One participant noted that code smells have 
been looked at in forensic analysis, and they can cause 
people to look more closely at areas of code. Depending 
on the attacker there could be at least two outcomes from 
a deceptive code smell; it could either scare the attacker 
away or motivate them to explore further. Another 
participant pointed out this was, in effect, ‘subconscious 
anomaly detection’ and dependent on cues and pattern 
recognition. To be useful the defender would need to 
consider the level of fidelity required to ensure that 
anomalies were recognised. This prompted discussion of 
what would need to be considered when using cues in a 
network because, in terms of behaviour and sense- 
making, they need to not be ‘too thick, too big, too 
many’. The conclusion from participants was that we 
could take this concept and break it out into more detail 
and that it could have lots of practical utility. The 
question was raised though about how to make this 
deception realistic for use against adversaries; for 
example, how could it be automated, scaled and tested? 
 
5.1.3. Sliding doors. This was a second provocation 
based on Japanese castle defences and focused on the 
idea of sliding doors that would allow access to different 
parts of the building depending on which side they were 
opened from, or may even just be one- way doors so that 
attackers would be trapped. One participant noted that 
this is classic deception. Another pointed out that there 
are parallels in cryptography with one-way functions, 
but few examples in the network space. A comparison 
was made with ‘tar pits’ as cyber deception tools where 
the attacker gets stuck and quitting the network is the 
only means of escape. Participants discussed whether it 
would it be possible to treat different types of network 
traffic in different ways. For example, could this idea be 
used to augment a tripwire approach to network 
protection so that if a tripwire is activated the system then 
changes how it looks to an attacker. Participants 
believed that this had value for cyber deception but some 
raised the issue of what would happen once the 
deception was known about. One participant countered 
this by linking the idea to cryptography where, ‘design 
philosophies focus on the strength of the algorithm but 
knowledge of the algorithm doesn’t mean that you have 
the key’. Just because you know the mechanism is there 
doesn’t mean it isn’t still valuable. This has been 
addressed in recent research that demonstrates that 
deception tactics can still be effective even when known 
about [50]. 
 
5.1.4. Gang graffiti and tagging. This provocation used 
the idea of gang graffiti and the way it is used to 
symbolise a gang’s turf and to act as a ‘no trespassing’ 
sign to rival gangs. When it came to considering how 
this could be used in cyber deception, participants felt it 
could act as a potential deterrent to attackers. It was 
observed though that what is more often seen on a 
network is that rather than acting as a deterrent an 
attacker would be more likely to either carry on with 
their attack and force other attackers out, or to simply use 
the network side-by-side with the other attackers. This 
raises the question posed by one participant, ‘if you have 
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multiple state actors and you see someone from your 
organisation there, does that cause a deconfliction issue 
back in the office, before you proceed further?’ Could 
this be used to slow down an attacker’s progress if they 
were a state actor? Another issue (similar to the one 
made about code smells) is how this would impact on 
the attacker’s decision-making process because for some 
this would be a deterrent and for others a call to arms to 
attack. Again, it was felt that this required knowledge of 
the attacker and who or what they might be afraid of. This 
raised the question of what fear might look like and how 
it might be used in cyber space, causing one participant 
to ask ‘Is it fundamentally different doing cyber 
deception then?’ A suggestion was made that it might be 
possible to increase fear in an attacker through the use of 
‘cold, generic info to make them feel that they have been 
doxxed’. A discussion ensued about how we bridge the 
gap between cyber and physical to capture or disrupt an 
adversary. Cyber creates threats and opportunities for 
new forms of deception that do not occur (or that occur 
quite differently) in the real world, through automation, 
anonymity, impersonation, and digital footprints. 
 
5.1.5. Indiana Jones narrative. This provocation took 
the narrative from the classic film Indiana Jones and The 
Last Crusade. In the film Indiana Jones has to deal with 
a series of protective booby traps to find the Holy Grail, 
which is hidden amongst hundreds of other potential 
grails, all of which fatally poison the person who drinks 
from it believing it to be the Grail. One participant 
pointed out that the idea of multiple potential grails is 
the equivalent of the cyber deception technique of hay-
stacking (for example, hiding real database entries 
amongst vast numbers of fake entries). Hay-stacking has 
some weaknesses though if an attacker can see that the 
defender is only touching the real object and the defender 
has to ensure that they touch both the real and fake 
objects. Another participant highlighted the fact that in 
the film Indiana Jones has to escape from the system of 
traps once he has got the Grail. In the network this 
would be an attacker who wants to achieve their aim but 
also wants to leave the network without being caught. In 
the discussion it was pointed out that some of the 
obstacles Indiana Jones faces are binary; if you trip one 
of them you are out; if you are caught, you are out and 
just as in the film there are, ‘lots of booby traps, just not 
working the way you would expect it’ so the question 
was raised about whether you ‘could conceive a parallel 
to this in a cyber domain - booby traps tied with the 
network self-destructing’ If a network self-destructs this 
undermines availability inflicting damage on both 
defender and attacker, potentially creating a denial of 
service attack on oneself. If the attacker’s objective is to 
deny the network this might make it easier for them 
because it could tie up SOC staff from defending other 
areas. The issue of exploits not working all the time was 
discussed with the conclusion that attackers getting a 
feel for their success rate could be a potential area for 
cyber deception. If everything is failing, or not working 
in expected ways, this increases confusion in the attacker. 
5.1.6. Deception for physical safety. This was a photo 
of a perfectly flat floor tiled to look as if it was 
undulating to ensure that people walked rather than ran 
on it. Again, one participant raised the issue of the 
longevity of this technique and doubted it would 
continue to work once it was known but another 
participant compared this to Kerckhoff’s Principle [51] 
noting that a cryptographic system should be secure even 
if everything about the system, except the key is public 
knowledge. This led to a discussion about what we gain, 
if anything, from the element of surprise. Widely 
publicising the use of cyber deception could mean that 
we cause our attacker to question everything which, in 
turn, could slow them down, as one participant 
commented, ‘Even though I know it’s there - if I went 
there, I would still feel uncomfortable’. While this form 
of deception may have diminishing returns, with the 
effect being greatest when first encountered, it could be 
relatively cheap to implement. We see these types of 
visual disruption in road flow control systems (e.g. 
illusory 3D crosswalks, anamorphic images of children 
playing in the street) to try to get drivers to slow down. 
Initially, such systems are effective, however, drivers 
soon become desensitized and are complacent in their 
presence, thereby increasing risk [52]. We would have to 
consider where we would get the most value from using 
this in the network and whether we design a cyber 
deception tool that was context aware. In response to this 
one participant noted, ‘perceptual cues are very powerful 
but very brittle – this might not work from other end of 
corridor or at night, for example’ and there may be 
similar issues deploying this type of cyber deception in a 
network. The issue of timing of the use of deception was 
raised. If you deploy deceptive assets too early you can 
waste them, and if they are deployed too late then their 
value may have ‘withered on the vine’. Participants 
highlighted the need to consider both timing of surprise 
in cyber deception and link it to the deceptive outcome 
we want to achieve. Interestingly, this accords with 
research recently carried out that demonstrated that the 
late timing of deception in an intrusion reduces cyber 
attacks [53]. 
 
5.2. Provocations and ideation. 
 
As was hoped, the provocations raised more questions 
than answers and participants demonstrated divergent 
thinking when it came to creating new ideas for 
implementing cyber deception. The discussion about 
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what deception is, and whether cyber deception is 
fundamentally different. Similarities and differences 
between cyber deception and deception in the physical 
world were raised especially around the idea of creating 
fear in an attacker and whether it was possible to do that 
on a network. There was discussion about the difference 
between deception, and influencing and shaping 
behaviours as well as the role played by more subtle 
deception techniques such as lures, cues and patterns and 
how these could be implemented on a network. The 
potential of cyber deception techniques to work two 
ways was also noted – either to deter an attacker or to 
provoke interest so that they investigate further. Finally, 
practical issues were highlighted such as how such 
cyber deception techniques could be automated, scaled 
and tested. 
 
5.3. Journey mapping 
 
A journey map is a way of designing a user experience for 
a new product. In our case the user is an attacker in the 
network and the product is cyber deception technology. 
For this task we broke the journey map down into five 
sections: (i) activities – this is where we focused most 
effort considering what needed to happen to develop 
innovative cyber deception technology; (ii) risks – what 
we should be concerned about through the development 
process; (iii) questions – what we need to know at each 
stage; (iv) success – defining how we would know if we 
had been successful; (v) opportunities and threats – what 
else could help or hinder us in achieving our goals? To 
select the provocations to journey map we asked 
participants to think about where they would place each 
the provocation on a PICK (Possible, Implement, Kill or 
Challenge) chart – a two by two matrix that plots ideas 
in terms of ease of implementation and potential 
benefits. There were three provocations that looked the 
most promising after the PICK activity, these were the 
Indiana Jones narrative, the deception for physical 
safety, and the gang graffiti and tagging. When we 
reflected back on the journey maps there was significant 
overlap between them and so we synthesised them into 
one overarching journey map for developing new cyber 
deception tools. 
 
5.3.1. Activities. The journey that we mapped for 
developing new cyber deception exploits comprised the 
following activities. Firstly, we need an idea of whether 
the attacker is human or software and, from this, we also 
need to understand the motivation and what different 
attack strategies might be invoked. For example, does the 
attacker care if they are discovered or do they hope to 
carry out their attack undetected? Second, we need a 
clear idea of what we are protecting with cyber deception 
and to surmise the likely path through the network that 
the attacker might take. So far these two activities are 
very similar to the process that would be followed for 
any risk assessment on a network (understanding the 
threat actor, the vulnerabilities and the assets to be 
protected). The difference perhaps is the lens through 
which risk is understood. For cyber deception capability 
development, the focus should be on putting ourselves in 
the position of the attacker and seeing the network 
through their eyes, rather than ours as the defender, and 
focusing on the technological tools we can improve. 
The next set of activities are different, however, and 
this is where, in the process of visualising the attacker’s 
journey, our participants brought together their expertise 
of deception techniques in different contexts. The first 
step suggested by participants involved actively 
exploring analogues from other domains of deceptive 
practice. As a result of doing this a range of risks, 
question, measures of success, opportunities and threats 
arose so that the following additions to the journey map 
were added for consideration when developing 
innovative cyber deception techniques. 
 
5.3.2. Questions. A range of questions central to the 
design process was raised by participants. The most 
important questions related to understanding how the 
network might look from the attacker’s perspective. This 
would require some kind of persona or threat model. 
Participants raised questions about the level of detail 
needed and highlighted the risk of relying on a model of 
the attacker that turned out to be incorrect or flawed (for 
example relying on previous attacker behavioural data 
which is not always consistent with the present). 
At the start of the process cyber defenders would also 
need to define what they want the attacker to do as a 
result of cyber deception. What is the desired behaviour 
and how might the attacker’s sensemaking be shaped to 
generate that behaviour? Subsidiary questions stemming 
from this include: 
• What perceptual cues do cyber defenders need to 
provide to attacker to shape their sensemaking? 
How can cyber defenders ensure that such cues will 
be detected and attended to by an attacker? And 
how can designers ensure that attackers will make 
desired sense of these cues? 
• How can cyber defenders increase an attacker’s 
dwell time in the network to deplete their resources 
and gather more information about their tactics, 
techniques and procedures? Would the return on 
being able to do this be of sufficient value for threat 
analysis to warrant the activity? 
• How might cyber defenders force an attacker to 
follow a desired path through a network? 
• How might cyber defenders instil fear in an attacker 
online? Would it be sufficient to startle them and, if 
so, how might this be achieved? 
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5.3.3. Measures of success. When considering 
measures of success participants raised the issue of what 
success might look like; whether it would look the same 
for all stakeholders and what it would look like to a 
customer. Participants felt that cyber defenders should 
also distinguish between measures of success at the level 
of individual cyber deception techniques as well as when 
they were used in combination and at steps in-between, 
such as observing cues that support deception 
techniques. One participant suggested we might want to 
look at a broader range of measures, perhaps even 
including stories about deception experiences in our 
network that were publicised on hacking forums. 
Another participant questioned whether measures of 
success might be overrated and that there could be 
benefits in blind application of techniques. This led to a 
discussion about whether this would be acceptable from 
a cost and ethical perspective. 
 
5.3.4. Risks, opportunities and threats. When 
considering risks, opportunities and threats participants 
raised the opportunity or threat of advertising the 
presence of deception and considered whether this might 
increase or decrease its effectiveness against an attacker. 
The point was also made that there could be unforeseen 
consequences if cyber deception techniques were used in 
combination – for example, might we inadvertently risk 
launching a denial of service against ourselves as 
defenders? 
Commercial considerations that could pose a risk to 
the development of cyber deception include the 
confidence cyber defenders have in cyber deception 
technology. One participant suggested that people would 
rather use cryptography than hay-stacking or covert 
paths. Cyber defenders need to increase confidence in 
the use of cyber deception technology as well as the 
integrity of the technology itself. Other points that 
participants believed organisations needed to consider 
were the legalities and ethics of using cyber deception 
technology and the cost of resources to develop and 
deploy it. 
Finally, an interesting theme that emerged as a result 
of the journey mapping exercise was that of time. There 
are temporal costs in terms of the length of the lifecycle 
of cyber deception exploits as well as other temporal 
aspects to consider such as the necessary length of time 
for exposure to cues, dwell time in the network, the 
potential value of false temporal cues as well as the 
temporal aspects of the commercial development and 
deployment of cyber deception technology. 
 
6. Limitations and reflections 
The use of design thinking enabled us to bring different 
academic disciplines and practitioners’ experiences into 
a generative dialogue to discuss ways of designing cyber 
deception tools and techniques that fuse deception 
techniques from different contexts and that bring 
together cognitive and technology effects. Running a 
design thinking workshop online across two countries 
and two time zones worked well and could be replicated 
with similarly sized groups of participants. Larger 
groups of participants would be difficult to manage in an 
online setting and to maintain organic group discussions. 
Running the workshop online was successful but 
resource intensive and demonstrates the need for skilled 
facilitators. This was a relatively small, qualitative, study 
but we believe this limitation was off-set by the expertise 
of our participants. Now we have demonstrated the 
potential of using design thinking for cyber deception 
our next steps will be to run further iterations of this 
workshop with a broader range of participants both in 
terms of occupation and academic disciplines. We would 
also like to trial other design thinking tasks within the 
online workshop and to prototype and test the outputs 
from this workshop further. 
The potential benefits of using design thinking 
included a broad conversation about how to affect the 
attacker’s behaviour and decision-making processes 
while in the network. Participants demonstrated 
divergent thinking by taking the provocations as a 
creative starting point and expanding the potential 
solutions from the technology through to the cognitive 
and behavioural effects on the attacker and how to 
achieve them. The journey map demonstrated 
convergent thinking with regard to operationalising 
cyber deception on a network. Participant discussions 
raised the positioning of a deceptive asset as part of an 
integrated and layered network defence strategy. The 
difficulty of evaluating and assessing the effectiveness 
of cyber deception technology against different attacker 
types and under a range of commercial pressures is an 
important consideration. 
From a research perspective a range of interesting 
areas for future work were identified. We identified a 
need for research that looks at fear, surprise and startle 
effects online; whether this is possible to achieve and 
what these effects might look like. The issue of time 
needs further research, specifically the effect of tempo on 
designing, developing and delivering cyber deception. 
Risks and unanticipated effects of cyber deception 
techniques, such as triggering a denial of service attack 
and the psychological impact on both attackers and 
cyber network defenders, needs to be explored. Each of 
these topics requires researchers to lift cyber deception 
research into a space that considers the socio-technical 







In conclusion, we have demonstrated the potential 
benefits of using design thinking to synthesise deception 
techniques from a range of contexts and illustrated the 
potential this could offer for developing new cyber 
deception tools and techniques. Such tools and 
techniques may offer a more subtle and nuanced 
approach to cyber deception and could become an 
important part of the cyber defender’s toolkit. In a 
military environment this could complement other 
manoeuvrist approaches to warfare. The substantive 
contribution has been to highlight areas for future 
research and practice in cyber deception. The 
methodological contribution has been to demonstrate the 
potential value of design thinking for cyber deception 
tools. Overall the study demonstrates the value of seeing 
the network through the eyes of the attacker and 
understanding how their experience could be shaped as 
they move through the network. 
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